In aggregate U.S. data, exogenous shocks to labor productivity induce highly persistent and hump-shaped responses to both the vacancy-unemployment ratio and employment. We show that the standard version of the Mortensen-Pissarides matching model fails to replicate this dynamic pattern due to the rapid responses of vacancies. We extend the model by introducing a sunk cost for creating new job positions, motivated by the well-known fact that worker turnover exceeds job turnover. In the matching model with sunk costs, vacancies react sluggishly to shocks, leading to highly realistic dynamics.
Introduction
The Mortensen-Pissarides job matching model has become the standard framework for analyzing macroeconomic labor adjustment. Recent research has focused on the ability of this model to explain various empirical facts about unemployment and job vacancies.
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A largely overlooked question concerns whether the model can account for the dynamic characteristics of labor market adjustment over the business cycle.
For example, aggregate employment is widely viewed as a lagging indicator of the business cycle by policy makers and business analysts. Business cycles are also linked to a characteristic pattern of unemployment and vacancy movements. As shown in This paper shows, however, that the model in its standard form cannot account for the cyclical pattern of unemployment and vacancies when calibrated to U.S. data, nor can it capture the associated dynamics of employment adjustment.
Modifying the model by introducing a sunk cost for the creation of new job positions, 1 For example, recent papers by Costain and Reiter (2005) , De Bock (2005) , Hagedorn and Manovskii (2005) , Krause and Lubik (2004) , Hall (2005) , Rudanko (2005) , Shimer (2005) and Silva and Toldeo (2005) evaluate the model's ability to account for the volatility of unemployment and vacancies given plausible shocks to labor productivity, while Bastos (2004) , Fujita (2003) , Fujita (2004) , Menzio (2004) and Yashiv (2005) consider other aspects of the model. See also Cole and Rogerson (1999) and Mortensen (1994) .
2 The negative empirical relationship between unemployment and vacancies is known as the Beveridge curve in recognition of the contribution of W.H. Beveridge. For a background discussion on the Beveridge curve, see Abraham (1987) , Blanchard and Diamond (1989) , Jackman, Layard, and Pissarides (1989) and the references therein. Bleakley and Fuhrer (1997) provide an updated empirical evaluation of the Beveridge curve. In this paper we focus on the dynamic characteristics of vacancy-unemployment relationship at business cycle frequencies. however, dramatically improves the performance of the model in matching the empirical dynamics.
We begin our analysis by estimating a three-variable VAR at quarterly frequency for the U.S. consisting of aggregate labor productivity, the vacancy-unemployment ratio and employment. In the context of the matching model, the vacancy-unemployment ratio reflects the intensity of search activities in the matching market, and thus it influences employment through match formation. Procyclical movements in the vacancyunemployment ratio capture the adjustment pattern depicted in Figure 1 . This specification allows us to trace the dynamic effects of labor productivity shocks on matching intensity, as measured by the vacancy-unemployment ratio, and employment. Note that in the context of the matching model, our identified cyclical productivity shock can be broadly interpreted as resulting from impulses to demand or technology.
4
The estimates reveal that the productivity driving process identified in our VAR has a high positive correlation with matching intensity and employment at lags of 0-2 quarters and 1-3 quarters, respectively. Correspondingly, the impulse responses for the two variables exhibit hump shapes, with matching intensity and employment peaking after four and five quarters, respectively. In the period of the shock, matching intensity jumps by about a third of the way toward its peak response, while employment does not jump.
We next consider the ability of the Mortensen-Pissarides model to account for these patterns. A discrete-time version of the model is calibrated to U.S. data, and simulated data are obtained using a productivity driving process that approximates the estimated process. The resulting dynamic correlations are sharply peaked at zero lag, in stark contrast to the empirical correlations. The impulse responses derived from the simulated data exhibit excessively large jumps in the period of the shock, and the subsequent responses fail to capture the empirical hump shapes. Thus, the standard matching model fails to capture the dynamic characteristics of the data.
The poor performance of the standard model can be traced to the rapid adjustment of vacancies following a shock. Firms in the model incur vacancy posting costs only on a period-by-period basis, and there are no other costs associated with creating job positions. Thus, they can respond freely to changes in productivity, causing vacancies to closely track the driving process.
Evidence suggests, however, that job positions behave differently from vacancies. Davis et al. (1996) , for example, emphasize that jobs themselves are created and destroyed at a rate substantially lower than the rate at which firms open up and fill vacancies. This makes sense if firms bear additional costs for creating job positions, over and above the cost of posting vacancies. Such costs could tend to slow the adjustment of positions in response to shocks, leading to sluggishness in vacancy adjustment.
To assess the importance of this mechanism for the dynamic performance of the matching model, we extend the model in a simple way by introducing sunk job creation costs. We assume that heterogeneous opportunities for creating new positions become available each period. To exploit these opportunities, potential entrant firms must pay a sunk cost before they can post a vacancy. Positions created in this way remain active, whether filled or unfilled, until they are eliminated by obsolescence. In particular, when a worker quits, the firm can post a vacancy to refill the position without incurring the sunk cost. This provides a meaningful distinction between job flows and worker flows. Moreover, potential entrant firms and firms with established positions will have different incentives to post vacancies.
Simulated data from the calibrated sunk cost model reproduce the dynamic correlations for matching intensity and employment with great precision. Impulse responses exhibit realistic hump shapes, with the correct timing of peaks. The initial jump in matching intensity closely matches the empirical estimate, while the counterfactual jump in employment is significantly reduced relative to the standard model.
The superior performance of the sunk cost model is explained by the fact that sunk costs cause vacancies to respond more smoothly following shocks. On impact, the increase in vacancies is dampened due to the limited availability of opportunities whose returns exceed the sunk cost. Since the shock persists, however, newly arising opportunities will have profitability above the steady state level in the periods following the shock. This leads to further increases in vacancies, even as productivity decreases toward the steady state. Similar reasoning applies with respect to negative shocks.
These smooth changes in vacancies underlie the realistic persistence exhibited by the simulated data.
Related literature. In their pioneering work, Diamond (1989, 1990) study the dynamic adjustment of vacancies and unemployment using VAR models that incorporate the labor force as a third variable. The impulse responses estimated by these authors capture the hump-shaped responses of vacancies and unemployment, consistent with our empirical analysis using the single matching intensity variable. Fujita (2004) studies vacancy persistence using an identification approach that builds on the method of Diamond (1989, 1990) , and he shows that the MortensenPissarides model cannot generate realistic persistence. In the present paper, we utilize a different identification procedure, based on direct use of labor productivity data, and we also consider employment dynamics. Further, we show that the deficiencies of the model can be corrected by introducing a sunk job creation cost.
Fujita (2003), Hornstein, Krusell, and Violante (2004) and Yashiv (2005) consider job matching models in which firms bear costs for adjusting the stock of job positions.
In Fujita (2003) , sluggish adjustment results from an initial job planning stage, while Yashiv (2005) introduces sluggishness by means of a standard convex adjustment cost.
Neither of these papers considers direct costs of job creation, nor do they develop the distinction between job flows and worker flows. Hornstein, Krusell, and Violante (2004) focus on steady-state economic growth rather than cyclical adjustment.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the empirical findings from the estimated VAR. The standard matching model and the sunk cost extension are developed in Section 3, and results are presented in Section 4. Section 5 concludes.
Cyclical shocks and adjustment
In this section we assess the cyclical characteristics of unemployment, vacancies and employment for the U.S. between 1951 and 2004. The first step is to determine an appropriate measure of cyclical shocks. Shimer (2005) has argued that average labor productivity can be used as a cyclical indicator for purposes of evaluating the matching model. This is compelling in that productivity incorporates a broad range of factors that influence the returns to employment. Productivity can itself be influenced by the labor market, however, so we must account for potential endogeneity in evaluating the effect of productivity on labor market variables.
We next specify an empirical relationship between productivity and the labor market variables. A large body of empirical work has demonstrated that hiring flows are well approximated by a constant returns-to-scale function of unemployment and job vacancies.
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This implies that hiring may be regarded as a function of the vacancyunemployment ratio. Thus, it makes sense to summarize the relationship between unemployment and vacancies in terms of the vacancy-unemployment ratio; we refer to the latter as matching intensity. This leads to the following reduced-form VAR:
where ln z t , ln vu t and ln emp t denote the logs of labor productivity, the vacancyunemployment ratio and the employment-population ratio, respectively; ε To identify the exogenous component of productivity, we use the recursive ordering ln z t , ln vu t and ln emp t , so that innovations to labor productivity are treated as exogenous with respect to matching intensity and employment in the current quarter. Among the six possible orderings of the three variables, this restriction eliminates the three orderings in which ln vu t is ordered before ln p t . The results for the remaining three orderings are nearly exogenous productivity series, denoted by ln z t , is determined by
where A 11 (L) is the estimated value of the polynomial in the first row and first column of A(L) and ε z t indicates the fitted residuals from (1). Note that (2) extracts the exogenous cyclical component of ln z t by suppressing the feedbacks to productivity from matching intensity and employment that are associated with the terms A 12 (L) and A 13 (L) in the second and third columns of the first row of the matrix polynomial.
The conditional correlations of ln vu t and ln emp t with ln z t at various leads and lags provide a summary measure of the dynamic relationship between cyclical shocks, matching intensity and employment. These correlations are computed from the follow-
where A 2j (L) and A 3j (L) give the estimated values of the polynomials in the j th column of the second and third rows, respectively. Impulse responses to a one-standard-deviation productivity shock can be computed by calculating the trajectories implied by (3). Results are reported in Figure 3 . As seen in the top panel, ln z t jumps by about 0.7 percent as a result of the shock, then returns monotonically to its steady state after oscillating slightly for two quarters.
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The dynamic pattern of unemployment and vacancy adjustment is captured in the indistinguishable from one another. For concreteness, we focus on one particular choice from among these three. 8 Since the identified productivity shock ε z t may have contemporaneous effects on the other two variables in the structural form (3), the elements A 21 (0) and A 31 (0) may be nonzero, in contrast to the restriction A 21 (0) = A 31 (0) = 0 in the reduced form (1).
9 Note that the estimated impulse response for ln z t is very close to the one generated by the 
where ln vac t and ln unemp t represent the logs of vacancies and unemployment, respectively; ε In this case, the worker enters the period t unemployment pool and the firm enters the pool of potential entrants. Second, separation may occur for reasons that do not destroy the job, which we refer to as a quit. For continuing matches, quits occur with probability λ q , while they occur with the higher probability λ n for matches that were newly-formed in the preceding period; this reflects the higher observed separation hazards among low-tenure employment relationships. Following a quit, the worker enters the period t unemployment pool and the firm enters the period t vacancy pool.
Agents that enter the period t matching pools as a consequence of separation are eligible to be rematched in period t.
If the worker-firm match survives the separation hazards, then the agents negotiate a contract that divides the period t surplus according to the Nash bargaining solution, where π gives the worker's bargaining weight and the threat point is a quit. Given that the worker and firm agree to continue, the match incurs a flow capital cost of κ and engages in production in period t. The output of the match is given by the productivity level z t , which evolves according to a Markov process.
Equilibrium. Let θ t = v t /u t denote the vacancy-unemployment ratio. For a worker who begins period t in the unemployment pool, the probability of ending period t in a job match is
where we have made use of the linear homogeneity of the function m. Let S t indicate the value of surplus for a match that survives the separation hazards in period t. A worker in the unemployment pool receives the benefit b along with a proportion of the surplus from any match made in in period t that survives into period t + 1. Thus, the expected present value of current and future receipts for an unemployed worker is given by
where β indicates the discount factor.
Similarly, for a firm that begins period t in the vacancy pool, the probability of ending period t in a job match is
and the expected present value of the firm's current and future receipts is
Note that the firm receives the outside option value V t+1 only if separation occurs as a consequence of a quit, whereas the worker receives U t+1 after either obsolescence or a quit. This follows from the fact that the job ceases to exist following obsolescence.
A job match that survives the separation hazards in period t obtains the following expected present value:
Equilibrium surplus is thus defined by
Because entry into the vacancy pool entails zero sunk cost, competitive pressure from potential entrant firms will drive the equilibrium value of a vacancy to zero, i.e., V t = 0 must hold for all t. Using (5), this gives rise to the following free entry condition:
Equations (4) and (6)- (8) determine equilibrium paths of U t , N t , S t and θ t for a given process z t . The equilibrium solution determines the law of motion for unemployment:
Vacancies adjust in each period in order to maintain the relationship v t /u t = θ t .
Sunk cost model
Motivation. The standard model has the key property that firms incur no costs to create job positions. Thus, unmatched firms are dissuaded from entering the vacancy pool only by the posting cost c. Equivalently, every unmatched firm has an implicit position to fill, and the model makes no distinction between the creation of positions and the filling of vacancies.
Evidence on job and worker flows, however, points to important differences between job positions and vacancies. Davis, Haltiwanger and Schuh (1996) , in particular, have stressed that the rate at which workers move across jobs greatly exceeds the rate at which filled jobs are created and destroyed. This difference can be measured by comparing steady-state match separation versus job destruction rates. Drawing on several sources of information, we calculate below that nearly 19 percent of employed workers separate from their jobs over the ensuing quarter, while the rate of job destruction itself is only about 8 percent per quarter. Thus, the "churning" of workers across filled job positions amounts to over 10 percent of employment each quarter.
Such large-scale churning stems from a strong tendency of employers to maintain job positions when workers depart. Indeed, Blanchard and Diamond (1990) argue that roughly 85 percent of quits are replaced, while Holzer (1989) finds that firms with a higher rate of worker turnover tend to post vacancies at a higher rate. Evidently, job positions become more valuable once they are created, indicating the presence of sunk costs for job creation. It is therefore sensible to extend the standard model by introducing sunk costs for creating new job positions. This modification leads to a meaningful distinction between job and worker flows, and also generates sluggishness in the adjustment of positions that carries over to vacancies.
Model description and equilibrium. The standard model is augmented as follows.
At the start of each period t, a number of opportunities for creating new job positions is randomly distributed among the potential entrant firms. Each opportunity allows an entrant to create one position by incurring a sunk cost of K. The positions differ in their attractiveness; for simplicity, we assume that heterogeneity of positions is reflected by differences in sunk costs. Let the continuous function F (K) give the total mass of opportunities in a period that have sunk cost no greater than K.
When an entrant receives an opportunity, it observes the aggregate productivity level for period t, and then chooses whether or not to create the position at a cost of K. If it chooses to create the position, then it may enter the vacancy pool for period t; moreover, it does not have to pay the sunk cost for this position in any future period, whether or not it is matched with a worker. However, at the start of each period the position becomes obsolete with probability λ d , and it ceases to exist thereafter. If the entrant chooses not to create the position, then the opportunity becomes unavailable in future periods.
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For the sunk cost model, the free entry condition (8) is replaced by
where K t is the entry margin. Potential entrants with K ≤ K t at the start of period t will choose to enter the vacancy pool, while those with K > K t will choose to stay out. New openings, denoted by e t , are determined by
The implied law of motion for vacancies is
Equilibrium paths of U t , N t , S t , K t , v t and e t are determined by equations (4)- (7), (10)- (11), and the identity v t /u t = θ t , given the z t process and the predetermined variables u t−1 and v t−1 . Vacancies become a state variable in this model due to the fact that only finitely many jobs can profitably be created in any given period, even though the value of an established vacancy is strictly positive.
Functional forms
We adopt the following functional forms. For the matching function we use the form introduced by den Haan et al. (2000):
Since this function always lies below unity, it does not require truncation, in contrast to the standard Cobb-Douglas specification. The stochastic process for productivity 13 We do not model the determination of F (K), nor do we allow a firm to hold its opportunity for more than one period, for reasons of parsimony. Under these assumptions there is no need to keep track of the distribution of available opportunities across potential entrants. Feedbacks between this distribution and search activities represent a potentially important additional source of propagation effects, however, as discussed in Conclusion.
assumes the standard first-order autoregressive form:
where ε t is normally distributed with mean zero and standard deviation σ ε . Note that the realization of ε t is observed by all workers and firms in the economy at the start of each period t.
Finally, for the sunk cost model we take the opportunity function F (K) to be linear in K with slope 1/K, i.e.:
Note that the standard matching model can be recovered as a limiting case by letting K approach zero. 
Measurement and calibration
To evaluate the two versions of the matching model, we generate artificial data that conforms to the U.S. data considered in Section 2. Our identification procedure establishes a direct correspondence between the theoretical driving process ln z t and the exogenous productivity component ln z t . The theoretical matching pools v t and u t , however, do not represent represent end-of-period stocks, but rather cumulations of all workers and firms available for matching in period t. Measured end-of-period stocks are obtained from the following formulas:
The variable ln(v m t /u m t ) thus corresponds to the empirical matching intensity variable ln vu t . Finally, the measured employment level is
14 This may be seen as follows. For small values of K, inflows of entrant firms would be very large if V t were not close to zero. Such large inflows would raise θ t , however, and thereby drive V t to zero.
Thus, V t must be close to zero, and the standard free entry condition V t = 0 must hold in the limit. and ln n m t corresponds to the employment variable ln emp t .
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We next summarize the calibration of the model at quarterly frequency; details of these calculations are given in the Appendix, and the chosen parameter values are presented in Table 1 . First, information from Fallick and Fleischman (2004) and Anderson and Meyer (1994) is used to construct estimates of quarterly separation rates for new and continuing job matches. These are given by 42.12 percent and 12.79 percent for the first and subsequent quarters of a match, respectively, giving an overall average separation rate of 18.89 percent per quarter.
To measure quarterly job finding rates we must account for the existence of workers who are out of the labor force but still available for work. As argued in the Appendix, it is reasonable to equate the number of such available workers to the number of officially 
Results
The standard and sunk cost models are solved using the nonlinear global projection 
Empirical evaluation
Dynamic correlations. Figure 5 presents the dynamic correlations of productivity with matching intensity and employment, calculated from simulated data, for the standard and sunk cost models, along with the empirical correlations originally reported in Figure 2 . The productivity-matching intensity correlations generated by the standard model, shown in the upper panel, exhibit an unrealistically sharp peak at zero lag, and fail to capture the flatness of the empirical correlations between lags of zero and two quarters. Further, as seen in the lower panel, the model makes the counterfactual prediction of almost perfect contemporaneous correlation between productivity and employment, and the correlations at lags of 2 and 3 quarters are too low. These results clearly show that the standard model does not generate realistic dynamics.
The sunk cost model, in contrast, yields correlation profiles that essentially duplicate the patterns seen in the data: the simulated correlations are flat over the correct ranges of lags, with the correct phasing. Notably, the sunk cost model does not produce the sharp peaks at zero lag that are characteristic of the standard model. Quantitatively, the correlations of matching intensity with current and lagged productivity are somewhat too high in the sunk cost model, as may be seen in the upper panel of Figure   5 . The model produces a remarkably close match with the productivity-employment correlations, however, as the lower panel shows. Moreover, the subsequent dynamics closely 16 Under our timing assumptions, the productivity shock induces a contemporaneous change in entry match the empirical hump shape. Overall, the sunk cost model does a much better job capturing the dynamic characteristics of the employment adjustment process.
Analysis
Vacancy adjustment and new openings. The dynamic properties of the standard and sunk cost models are linked to the behavior of vacancies. This is illustrated in Figure 8 
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In the standard model, the vacancy stock spikes upward in the period of the shock, and then decreases monotonically in tandem with productivity. This means the initial large inflow of vacancies is immediately reversed by outflows, as the bottom panel shows. Since there is no sunk cost for entering the matching pool, potential entrant firms can freely alter their job creation decisions to compete away rents following a shock. Consequently, the vacancy stock adjusts directly with productivity.
In the sunk cost model, the initial upward jump is much smaller, and vacancies continue to rise for several periods following the shock. The bottom panel of Figure   8 shows how the increases in vacancies gradually diminish, in contrast to the abrupt adjustment exhibited by the standard model. This smooth adjustment of the changes in vacancies underlies the persistent responses of the vacancy stock, matching intensity and employment exhibited by the sunk cost model.
Smooth adjustment arises because of the way sunk job creation costs affect the responses of potential entrant firms. The initial upward jump in vacancies following a into the vacancy pool, and the job matches generated by these added vacancies are counted as higher employment at the end of the period. The measured jumps in both matching intensity and employment would be reduced by a measurement convention that incorporated some averaging of beginning-and end-of-period levels.
17 Other graphs in the paper are expressed as log deviations from steady-state values. In this instance, considering level deviations allows us to decompose net vacancy changes into separate gross inflows and outflows.
positive productivity shock is limited by the availability of profitable opportunities for creating new openings, reflected in the opportunity function. Moreover, persistently higher productivity pushes the equilibrium entry margin K t above its steady state value. This raises the volume of new openings relative to the steady state, as may be seen in (11), and leads to further increases in vacancies. As the entry margin returns to the steady state along with productivity, the increases in vacancies gradually diminish. Similar reasoning applies with respect to negative productivity shocks: lower productivity drives down the entry margin and new openings, causing vacancies to decrease for several periods following a shock.
The quantitative importance of new openings can be seen by decomposing the net changes in the measured vacancy stock into separate outflow and inflows, using (12):
Observe that the net changes comprise gross outflows due to obsolescence and hires, together with gross inflows due to repostings following quits and new openings. Figure 9 plots the impulse responses for these gross flows, which make up the impulse response for the sunk cost model shown in the bottom panel of Figure 8 . The graph clearly
shows that vacancy adjustment is almost entirely driven by new openings and hires.
Further, the inflows from new openings lead the outflows from hires, as a consequence of the matching process. In the four quarters following the shock, new openings inflows exceed hiring outflows, accounting for the vacancy increases observed in Figure 8 . 
Our analysis of steady state separation rates suggests that λ 
Amplification of shocks
Recent literature has focused on the ability of the matching model to amplify productivity shocks in order to explain the volatility of the vacancy-unemployment ratio. This question may be addressed using our calibrations of the standard and sunk cost models. Shimer (2005) shows that the amplification of productivity shocks is sensitive to the value of b, with larger values of b leading to greater amplification. To assess the sensitivity of amplification under our calibration, we reevaluate the standard model using Shimer's suggested value of b = .40, with the other parameters adjusted to maintain the calibration requirements.
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Under the alternative parameter values, the volatility of matching intensity is reduced to 0.199 from 0.363. Broadly speaking, our results thus confirm that the matching model may generate insufficient volatility of the vacancy-unemployment ratio, but the amplification mechanism is not nearly so weak as suggested by Shimer (2005) .
Conclusion
This paper has evaluated the cyclical dynamics of job matching intensity, as measured by the vacancy-unemployment ratio, and employment, where business cycles are driven by exogenous shocks to labor productivity. The two variables respond to shocks in similar ways, with employment responses lagging matching intensity responses by one quarter. Both variables display the "hump-shaped" dynamics that are commonly observed throughout the empirical business cycle literature.
We show that the standard matching model, as exemplified by Pissarides (2000, ch. 1), cannot account for the observed dynamic patterns. Because potential entrant firms are able to respond easily to shocks, the vacancy pool adjusts in tandem with productivity. As a consequence, most of the adjustment of matching intensity and employment occurs in the period of the shock, leading to counterfactual dynamic correlations and impulse responses. Introducing a sunk cost for creating job positions causes the stock of vacancies to adjust sluggishly, leading to realistic dynamic behavior. Our results suggest that sunk job creation costs may play a central role in explaining cyclical adjustment. Moreover, the modified matching model can generate highly realistic employment dynamics without resort to any kind of consumption-smoothing mechanism.
The paper has relied on a number of simplifying assumptions that we believe are worth evaluating in future research. First, the arrival of new opportunities for creating job openings is taken to be exogenous and constant across periods. A more complete theoretical model would tie this distribution to underlying investments made by firms (e.g., in physical capital or R&D). This creates further possibilities for longer-run feedbacks from the labor market to productivity that might serve as important additional sources of propagation. Relatedly, the assumed equivalence of newly-created and preexisting job positions can be modified by incorporating a vintage structure, whereby new jobs enjoy higher productivity. This permits the endogenous obsolescence of jobs and the turnover of workers to be considered as separate flows within a common framework.
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Finally, we have ignored the effects of cyclical variation in the relative sizes of the pools of unemployed workers and workers out of the labor force but available for work, and in the flows between these pools. Changes in the characteristics of the latter pool may, however, represent another important source of longer-run propagation effects.
6 Appendix 6.1 Calibration Separation rates. The monthly average separation rate for job matches can be calculated as the average of monthly outflows from job matches divided by total employment. Monthly outflows consist of worker transitions to new job matches, unemployment, and out of the labor force. Fallick and Fleischman (2004) have recently provided measures of aggregate U.S. stocks and flows of workers, derived from the Current Population Survey (CPS) for 1994 and 1996-2003 , that include these three transitions. The numbers reported by Fallick and Fleischman imply outflows from unemployment that are inconsistent with steady state, so we adjust them slightly to achieve consistent steady-state flows and stocks. Adjusted flows and stocks are reported in Table 3 . The units represent percentages of noninstitutional civilian population aged 16 and over.
Observe that 4.15 new matches are created each month, while total employment is 63.15; thus, the implied steady-state separation rate is 4.15/63.15 = .0674 per month.
This figure is roughly corroborated by Anderson and Meyer (1994) , who consider a large panel of workers derived from U.S. state unemployment insurance records for [1978] [1979] [1980] [1981] [1982] [1983] [1984] . In their sample, 17.23 percent of job matches experience a permanent separation each quarter, which translates into an average monthly separation rate of .0611. Anderson and Meyer (1994) also find that 43.42 percent of job matches observed during a quarter have duration of less than one year, which cannot hold unless these newer matches experience separation at rates in excess of .0611. We incorporate this fact in a parsimonious way by specifying a higher separation rate in the first month of a match.
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We calculate values for monthly separation rates in the first and subsequent months such that, in the steady state, 43.42 percent of matches have duration of less than one year when the flow of new matches is 4.15 per month. This yields monthly separation rates of .3663 and .0446 in the first and subsequent months, respectively, which translate into quarterly separation rates in the first quarter and subsequent quarters as follows:
Job finding and vacancy filling rates. As seen in Table 3 , a significant number of workers flow directly into employment from out of the labor force each month. Thus, our measurements must account for a pool of workers who are out of the labor force but still available for work. Since a total of 2.45 workers flow into the labor force each month, there must be at least this many available workers at the start of the month.
Further, assume that proportion ω of the workers who remain out of the labor force 20 This calibration procedure matches the distribution of employment durations, but not the duration-specific survival probabilities, since separations are crowded into the first month. Fitting the survival probabilities would require match-specific separation rates, and the number of categories of employed workers would correspondingly expand. In this paper we have opted instead for the simplest specification that allows new matches to separate at a higher rate.
at the end of the month are also available, corresponding to those whom the CPS records as not engaging in search activity but still willing to take a job if contacted by a searching firm. Evidence from the 1994 CPS, discussed in Castillo (1998, p. 36), indicates that this group amounts to anywhere between 22.5 and 77.5 percent of the officially unemployed population, yielding a range of ω between .025 and .085. We settle on the value of ω that equates the number of officially unemployed workers to the number of available workers, i.e., 3.4 = 2.45 + 31ω, or ω = .0306.
Monthly steady-state transition rates for newly separated, unemployed and available workers into new employment, unemployment and out of the labor force may be calculated from Table 3 . For example, monthly job finding rates for newly separated, Next we use evidence from JOLTS to determine the vacancy filling rate q(θ). JOLTS measures the vacancy rate as follows:
According to the JOLTS, the monthly average level of the vacancy rate is 2.5 percent 
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To pin down these three parameters, we combine the worker turnover rates with the job flow rates reported by the Business Employment Dynamics (BED) statistics. According to Faberman (2004) , the quarterly job flow rates in the private sector averaged around 8 percent over the period 1990 through 2003. We equate this measured job destruction rate to the corresponding magnitude in the model:
The first term on the left-hand side measures job obsolescence, while the second term reflects jobs that become vacant as a result of quits, and remain vacant at the end of the period. Since job destruction in the BED is computed from employment changes over a quarter, both sources of employment change must be included. Using the previously determined values of q(θ), u, and m, equations (15), (16), and (17) Other parameters. We adopt the standard values β = .99 and π = .50 for the discount factor and worker bargaining weight. Productivity is normalized by setting z = 1, and the parameters ρ and σ ε are selected to match the dynamics generated by our Section 2 estimates.
For the standard model we make use of the value function equations (4)- (7) in the steady state, together with the free entry condition V = 0, to specify the remaining 21 In view of the free entry condition V t = 0, the equilibrium conditions for the standard model are influenced only by the combined separation rates 
The unemployment benefit b is selected so that b = .65(z − κ), i.e., the unemployment benefit is 65 percent of net match output. This lies between the values of 40 percent and 94.3 percent suggested by Shimer (2005) and Hagedorn and Manovskii (2005) , respectively, and close to the value of 75 percent proposed by Costain and Reiter (2005) . This procedure yields the values c = .193, κ = .293 and b = .460.
For the sunk cost model we must also specify the parameter K of the opportunity function. For a given value of c, the parameters κ and b are chosen to satisfy (18) and
, while K is chosen so that the free entry condition V = K is consistent with our previously estimated value of e:
.058 = V K .
It remains to specify the parameter c. There is little direct evidence as to the level of flow posting costs. The responsiveness of K t to changes in z t is highly sensitive to c, however, so we use second moment properties of the model to pin down this parameter. The implied standard deviation of the vacancy-unemployment ratio is .303. Table 1 summarizes the choices of parameter values for both models.
Solution Method
Standard Model. For the standard model, the aggregate state of the economy for period t is a set of variables {m t−1 , u t−1 , z t }.
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We set the aggregate state space to m− 22 Note that m t−1 is in the set of period-t state variables because new matches and preexisting matches are subject to different separation hazard rates. In the sunk cost model below, v t−1 is also a state variable, and therefore we do not need to treat m t−1 as a separate state variable.
, where m and u are the steady-state values of the number of new matches and unemployment.
We parameterize the right-hand side of equations (4), (6) and (8) . Finally, we simulate a long time series (200, 000 observations) using the obtained solution functions in order to check that the economy remains within the specified state space.
Sunk Cost Model. We solve the sunk cost model in a similar way. The period-t state variables in this economy consist of {u t−1 , v t−1 , z t }. The state space is defined as
, where v and u are the steady-state values of vacancies and unemployment. This time we parameterize the right-hand side of equations (4), (5) and (6), again as a tensor product of second-order Chebyshev polynomials of the state variables. Because there are three state variables and three functions to be parameterized, there is the same number of unknowns (= 81).
Using the initial guess of the set of unknown parameters for the parameterized equation (5), the entry conditions (10) and (11) pin down the entry level e t at each grid point. Using the law or motion for vacancies (12), we can then obtain the next period value of vacancies v t corresponding to the initial grid point. The next period unemployment u t is also obtained from equation (9). Given the distribution of the productivity shock t , we can compute the conditional expectation of the right-hand side of equations (4), (5) and (6). Each of the three conditional expectations is evaluated at 27 grid points, and the new set of coefficients is obtained by equating the right-hand side of equations (4), (5) and (6) to the values of the approximating functions at those grid points. The iteration process continues until convergence of the coefficients is achieved. 
